1.2.08

Sebagian kecil kekayaan keluarga Soeharto di negeri manca



Foto keluarga Soeharto

Berdiri baris belakang (ki-ka): Sigit Hardjojudanto, Siti Herdiyanti Rukmana, Bambang Trihatmodjo

Depan (ki-ka): Hutomo Mandala Putra, Soeharto, Siti Hutami (Mamiek), Tien Soeharto, Titik Hedijati

______________________________

Sebagian kecil kekayaan keluarga Soeharto di luar negeri

Britania Raya (UK)

Lima rumah seharga antara 1-2 juta Poundsterling (1 Poundsterling = Rp 18,000) di London, yang terdiri dari:

Rumah Sigit Harjojudanto di 8 Winington Road, East Finchley

Rumah Sigit Harjojudanto di Hyde Park Crescent

Rumah Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana (Tutut) di daerah Kensington

Rumah Siti Hediyati Haryanti (Titiek Prabowo) di belakang Kedubes AS di Grosvernor Square

Rumah Probosutedjo di 38A Putney Hill, Norfolk House, London SW.15/6 AQ : 3 lantai, dengan basement.

(sumber-sumber: Tiara , 5 Desember 1993: 35; Forum Keadilan , 1 Juni 1996: 47; Dewi , Juni 1996; Swa , 19 Juni - 9 Juli 1997: 85; Far Eastern Economic Review , 9 April 1998; mahasiswa Indonesia serta wartawan Inggris dan Indonesia di London dan Jakarta).

Amerika Serikat

Dua rumah Dandy N. Rukmana dan Danti I. Rukmana (anak laki-laki dan anak perempuan Tutut) di Boston, dengan alamat:

60 Hubbard Road , Weston, Massachussets (MA) 02193 (sejak Juli 1995)

337 Bishops Forest Drive , Waltham , MA 02154 (sejak Februari 1992)

Dua rumah anak-anak Sudwikatmono di:

Hillcrest Drive , Beverly Hills , California ,

Doheney Drive , Beverly Hills , California

Rumah peristirahatan keluarga Suharto di Hawaii.

(sumber-sumber: Eksekutif , Maret 1990: 133-134; Tiara , 5 Desember 1993: 35 Far Eastern Economic Review , 9 April 1998; Ottawa Citizen , 16 Mei 1998; hasil investigasi aktivis pro-demokrasi Indonesia di AS)

Laut Karibia

Rumah-rumah peristirahatan keluarga Suharto di Kepulauan Bermuda dan Cayman (sumber-sumber: Ottawa Citizen , 16 Mei 1998; Die Welt , 23 Mei 1998)

Suriname

Raden Notosoewito, adik tiri Suharto dari Desa Kemusuk, Kabupaten Bantul, DI. Yogyakarta, adalah ketua Yayasan Kemusuk Somenggalan. Yayasan ini adalah pemegang saham PT Mitra Usaha Sejati Abadi (MUSA), holding company dari satu konglomerat yang punya berbagai bidang usaha di Indonesia (Solo, Yogya, Malang, DKI Jaya), Singapura, Hong Kong, dan Suriname.

Di negeri yang tersebut terakhir itu, Suriname, konglomerat ini pada tahun 1993 mendapat konsesi hutan seluas 150 ribu hektar di Distrik Apura, Suriname bagian Barat. Konsesi itu merupakan awal dari rencana MUSA untuk menanamkan modal sebesar US$ 1,5 milyar, sebagian besar untuk sektor kehutanan. Konsesi hutan ini, serta praktek MUSA Group untuk juga memborong kayu dari daerah di luar konsesinya sendiri, telah mendapatkan serangan dari gerakan lingkungan di mancanegara.

Selain dampak lingkungan dan budayanya yang sangat merusak bagi suku-suku Amerindian Maroon di Distrik Apura, yang juga jadi sorotan adalah bagaimana konsesi itu diperoleh berkat 'diplomasi tingkat tinggi' antara Suharto, sebagai Ketua Gerakan Non-Blok waktu itu, dengan para petinggi Surinam yang keturunan Jawa, khususnya Menteri Sosial Surinam, Willy Sumita. Diplomasi tingkat tinggi, di mana konon uang sogokan sebanyak US$ 9 juta berpindah ke
tangan para politisi, dikenal di sana dengan istilah "The Indonesian Connection". Salah satu pendekatan yang dilakukan oleh Yayasan Kemusuk Somenggalan, yang beroperasi di Paramaribo, Ibukota Surinam dengan bantuan Kedubes RI di sana, adalah menawarkan bantuan untuk renovasi Istana Presiden Suriname. Proyek itu ditawarkan untuk diborong oleh anak perusahaan MUSA sendiri. (sumber-sumber: Kompas , 15 Maret 1993, hal. 14 [iklan ucapan
selamat atas terpilihnya Suharto dan Tri Sutrisno sebagai Presiden & Wk. Presiden

RI]; EIA, 1996: 32; Skephi & IFAW, 1996; Friedland & Pura, 1996; Harrison, 1996; de Wet, 1996; Toni and Forest Monitor, 1997: 26-27, 29-30)

Aotearoa (New Zealand)

Kawasan wisata buru seluas 24,000 Ha bernama Lilybank Lodge di kaki Mount Cook dan di tepi Danau Tekapo di Southern Island bernilai NZ$ 6 juta (1 NZ$= Rp 4000), yang dibeli lisensinya dari Pemerintah NZ oleh Tommy Suharto tahun 1992. (sumber: AFP , 20 Mei 1998; Australian Financial Review , 27 Mei 1998; hompage: www.lilybank.co.nz ; hasil investigasi lapangan G.J.Aditjondro ke Lilybank, bulan Februari 1998).


Australia

Kapal pesiar mewah (luxury cruiser ) milik Tommy Suharto seharga Aust$ 16 juta (1 Aust$ = Rp 5.000), yang diparkir di Cullen Bay Marina di Darwin.

Merger antara perusahaan iklan ruang asal Melbourne, NLD, dengan kelompok Humpuss milik Tommy & Sigit, tahun 1997, berbarengan dengan pembelian saham perusahaan iklan ruang terbesar di Malaysia, BTABS (BT Advertising Billboard Systems), memberikan Tommy dan partner Australianya, Michael Nettlefold, konsesi atas billboards di sepanjang freeways di Negara Bagian Victoria, Australia, serta sepanjang jalan-jalan toll NLD-Humpuss di Malaysia,
Filipina, Burma dan Cina.

Perjanjian persekutuan strategis (strategic alliance) antara Kelompok Sahid milik Keluarga Sukamdani Gitosarjono dengan Kemayan Hotels and Leisure Ltd., yang ditandatangani bulan Desember 1997, memungkinkan Sahid ikut memiliki 50 hotel milik Park Plaza International (Asia Pacific) di kawasan Asia-Pasifik serta 180 hotel Park Plaza di AS. Dengan demikian, 24 hotel milik kelompok Sahid di Indonesia dan Medinah, Arab Saudi, diganti namanya menjadi Sahid Park Plaza Hotel. Harap diingat bahwa Sukamdani Gitosardjono, sejak 28 Oktober 1968 menjabat sebagai Ketua Harian Yayasan Mangadeg Surakarta, yang didirikan dengan dalih membangun dan mengelola kuburan keluarga besar Suharto. Jadi tidak tertutup kemungkinan, bahwa ekspansi Kelompok Sahid ke Arab Saudi, AS, dan Asia-Pasifik melalui Kelompok Kemayan/Park Plaza ini, juga memperluas sumber pendapatan keluarga Suharto di berbagai negara itu.

(sumber-sumber: Tempo , 3 Desember 1977: 8-9; Info Bisnis , Juli 1994: 9-23; Kontan , 10 Maret 1997; Australian Financial Review , 17 Desember 1997, 13 Maret 1998; Weekend Australian , 10-11 Agustus 1998; Sydney Morning Herald , 17 Agustus 1996, 11 Desember 1997, 6 April 1998; The Suburban , Darwin, 11 Juni 1998; Port Phillip/Caulfield Leader , 22 Juni 1998; sumber-sumber lain)


Singapura

Perusahaan tanker migas milik Bambang Trihatmodjo dkk, Osprey Maritime, yang total memiliki 30 tanker, dengan nilai total di atas US$ 1,5 milyar (US$ 1 = Rp 10.000). Sejak Juni 1996, dua tanker Osprey, yakni Osprey Alyra dan Osprey Altair, dikontrak oleh Saudi Basic Industrial Corporation untuk mengangkut minyak dan produk-produk petrokimia dari Arab Saudi ke mancanegara. Dengan akuisisi perusahaan tanker Norwegia yang terdaftar di Monaco, Gotaas-Larsen, oleh Osprey Maritime yang disepakati bulan Mei 1997, perusahaan milik Bambang Trihatmodjo ini menjadi salah satu maskapai pengangkut migas terbesar di Asia. (sumber-sumber: Economic & Business Review Indonesia , 5 Juni 1996; Asiaweek , 23 Mei 1997: 65; LNG Current News , 13 Februari 1998).

Perusahaan tanker migas milik Tommy & Sigit, Humpuss Sea Transport Pte. Ltd. adalah anak perusahaan PT Humpuss INtermoda Transport (HIT), yang pada gilirannya adalah bagian dari Humpuss Group. Tapi dengan berbasis di Singapura, perusahaan itu -- yang berpatungan dengan maskapai Jepang, Mitsui O.S.K. Lines -- dapat mengoperasikan ke-13 tanker migas dan LNGnya, lepas dari intervensi Pertamina pasca-Reformasi. Ini setelah berhasil menciptakan
reputasi bagi dirinya sendiri berkat kontrak jangka panjangnya dengan Taiwan Perusahaan Singapura ini pada gilirannya punya anak perusahaan yang berbasis di Panama, First Topaz Inc. (sumber-sumber: Swa , Mei 1991: 45-46; Prospek , 18 Januari 1992: 40-43;Info Bisnis , November 1994: 12; Jakarta Post , 20 November 1997).

Malaysia, Filipina, Burma, dan Cina

Di ke-4 negara Asia ini, Siti Hardiyanti Rukmana masih menguasai jalan-jalan tol sebagai berikut:

166,34 Km jalan toll antara Wuchuan - Suixi - Xuwen di Cina;

83 Km Metro Manila Skyway & Expressway di Luzon, Filipina;

22 Km jalan toll antara Ayer Hitam dan Yong Peng Timur, yang merupakan Bagian dari jalan tol Proyek Lebuhraya Utara Selatan sepanjang 512 Km yang menghubungkan Singapura, Johor, sampai ke perbatasan Muangthai di Malaysia;

Jalan toll patungan dengan Union of Myanmar Holding Co. di Burma.

(sumber-sumber: Info Bisnis , Juni 1994: 11-12; Swa , 5-18 Juni 1997: 47; AP, 21 Februari 1997; Economic & Business Review Indonesia , 5 Maret 1997: 44)


Sumber :

http://www.hamline.edu/apakabar/index.html

Daftar ini baru meliputi sebagian kecil saja kekayaan keluarga besar Suharto berwujud rumah, kawasan buru, kapal layar mewah, serta perusahaan properti dan perusahaan tanker yang sebagian atau seluruhnya milik keluarga bekas kepala negara ketiga terkaya di dunia. Ini belum lagi saham mereka dalam puluhan perusahaan di luar negeri.

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31.1.08

Diskusi Online "Warisan Soeharto"

Jumat, 1 Februari 08 Pukul 20.00 GMT
(Sarasehan 1 Dekade Reformasi PCIM UK)


Bismillaahirrahmaanirrahiim Assalamualaikum Wr. Wb.

Sepeninggal bapak Orde Baru yang hampir bisa dibilang tidak tersentuh oleh hukum membuahkan banyak pertanyaan. Salah satunya adalah bagaimana masa depan demokrasi di Indonesia pasca-kematiannya?

Indikasi dari pertanyaan ini adalah bahwa selama 32 tahun dibawah kepemimpinan Soeharto, kehidupan perpolitikan telah tersusun secara sistematik dibawah pengaruhnya dan tidak ada perubahan radikal (revolusi) pada saat kejatuhan di tahun 1998. Sehingga selama hampir
10 tahun turun dari jabatan presiden, kita masih bisa merasakan sistem nilai warisan Soeharto, dalam hal nilai etika, moral, ideologi, sosial, estetik, dsb. Sebagian terasa positif, sebagian
lebih terlihat negatif.

Oleh karena itu, akan sangat menarik untuk mendiskusikan bagaimana budaya yang diciptakan atau dikembangkan Soeharto, baik melalui media, birokrasi, korporatisme negara, dll, dan bagaimana nasib ke depan warisan budaya Soeharto ini.

Pimpinan Cabang Istimewa Muhammadiyah UK mengundang kawan-kawan mahasiswa serta masyarakat pada umumnya untuk berdiskusi tentang Warisan Budaya Soeharto via Yahoo Messenger Conference yang akan diselenggarakan pada:

Hari/tanggal :
Jumat, 1 Februari 2008

Pukul :
20:00 GMT
(diharapkan mulai online pukul 19:30 GMT untuk persiapan conference)

Narasumber :
* James Lapian, BBC London, mantan wartawan Tempo dan personil Orkes Moral Pancaran Sinar Petromaks, grup musik humor dan protes mahasiswa UI

* Amich Alhumami, Peneliti Sosial, PhD Student Department of Social Anthropology, University of Sussex , UK . Kolumnis media massa Indonesia

Moderator :
* Arianto Sangadji, Aktivis LSM Palu, Yayasan Tanah Merdeka, Mahasiswa Birmingham University

Aturan main dalam diskusi :

* Untuk kemudahan acara, peminat diharapkan memasukkan

pengurus.muhammadiyah@yahoo.co.uk

sebagai kontak paling lambat Jumat, 1 Februari, jam 19:00 GMT. Setelah conference berjalan,
peserta dapat mengundang rekannya untuk join conference ini.

* Untuk lancarnya acara, yang mempunyai hak bicara hanya 3 orang:
moderator dan 2 pembicara.

* Partisipan dapat menuliskan pertanyaan atau tanggapan via chat di YM conference. Moderator akan menentukan pertanyaan/tanggapan mana yang akan dibahas.

Sebagai catatan diskusi online ini adalah acara pra pendahuluan Sarasehan 1 Dekade Reformasi yang akan diselenggarakan :

Hari/Tanggal :
Kamis, 6 Maret 2008

Tempat :
38 Grosvenor Square London, W1K 2HW

Pembicara :
1. Prof. Dr. H.M Din Syamsuddin, Ketua Muhammadiyah Pusat
2. Prof. Dr. Ryass Rasyid, Anggota DPR RI
3. Dr. Rizal Sukma, CSIS
4. Prof. Dr. Dewi Fortuna Anwar, LIPI, The Habibie Center
5. Clara Yuwono, CSIS
6. Budiman Kastaman, Perwakilan BI London

Untuk acara Sarasehan 1 Dekade Reformasi akan diumumkan lebih lanjut.

Jika ada pertanyaan silahkan mengirim email ke

pengurus.muhammadiyah@yahoo.co.uk.

Terima Kasih

…Wassalamualaikum warohmatullahi wabarokatuh…

Viza Ramadhani
Wakil Ketua PCIM UK

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Mayangsari melayat Pak Harto

Silakan klik:

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=cG2VmdbBXF4&feature=PlayList&p=E8DDBAEB9518AD98&index=20

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Kematian Soeharto di pers Perancis

Surat Dari Montmartre

Sejak Soeharto naik panggung kekuasaan dan mengendalikan jalannya Republik Indonesia, sekali pun Perancis tergabung dalam IGGI dan kemudian CGI, boleh dikatakan hubungan antara kedua negara tidak hangat. Lebih-lebih ketika Mei 1981, Perancis berada di bawah kekuasaan Partai Sosialis dan partai-partai kiri. Ketika partai-partai kanan , RPR dan UDF, sekutu RPR, berkuasa menggantikan Partai Sosialis dan partai-partai kiri [kiri majemuk, la gauche plurielle], sikap Perancis pada Orde Baru Soeharto pun tidak mengalami perobahan mendasar. Sikap tidak hangat pemerintah Perancis ini, barangkali bisa diusut dari sejarah negeri ini, yang melalui beberapa kali revolusi, sampai memenggal kepala raja di depan publik, akhirnya sampai pada nilai "liberté, egalité et fraternité [kemerdekaan, kesetaraan dan persaudaraan]. Nilai-nilai ini sampai sekarang dijadikan motto Republik Perancis, dicantumkan di semua surat-surat dan dokumen segala keputusan resmi. Rangkaian nilai yang menjadi isi konsep republik, dituangkan ke dalam undang-undang dan peraturan-peraturan. Ia ditanamkan sejak anak-anak masuk sekolah.


Memang nampak juga satu paradoks ketika Perancis ikut dalam IGGI , organisasi internasional terdiri dari berbagai negara besar yang kuat ekonominya, dan sejak awal berdirinya Orde Baru boleh dikatakan penyangga utama ekonomi dan politik Orde Baru. Tapi ikutnya Perancis di dalam IGGI, barangkali bisa dipahami dari posisi Perancis sebagai negara kapitalis, yang tidak ingin membiarkan Indonesia, sebuah pasar besar dan sumber bahan mentah berlimpah, hanya dikuasai oleh negeri-negeri anggota IGGI -- kemudian berobah menjadi CGI. IGGI merupakan sebuah forum internasional untuk membagi-bagi "kueh" Indonesia.


Oleh latar belakang demikian, maka sering nampak politik pemerintah dan sikap rakyat Perancis, termasuk yang muncul di media massa, sering berbeda. Seakan di sini kita saksikan adanya dua Perancis: Perancis resmi dan Perancis rakyat.


Hal ini pun kembali tercermin dalam menghadapi kematian Soeharto. Sejauh ini, aku belum juga membaca dan mendapatkan ucapan belasungkawa resmi dari pemerintah Sarkozy dan Fillon. Bahkan Harian Le Figaro, koran yang dekat dengan kekuasaan sekarang, sejauh ini masih tidak sebaris pun memberitakan tentang kematian Soeharto. Apakah ketiadaan baris kalimat pemberitaan begini merupakan suatu sikap politik dari sebuah koran nasional penting berpengaruh dan dekat dengan penyelenggara negara di negeri ini? Memberitakan atau tidak, kukira adalah suatu sikap. Sikap politik.


Sementara koran-koran, radio dan tivi yang memberitakannya, satu dalam penilaian terhadap Soeharto. Semuanya menggunakan istilah "diktatur", "pembunuh rakyat Indonesia" [l'Humanité] , "kriminal", "pelanggar HAM", "melakukan génocide" [la Croix, 28 Januari 2008] dan "koruptor terbesar dalam zaman kita [Direct Soir, 28 Januari 2008]. Bahkan Harian Libération menggunakan istilah "kekuasaan yang setara dengan monarkhi" yang "membangun monarkhinya dengan tanpa ampun menghancurkan lawan-lawan potensialnya atau dengan membeli mereka" [28 Januari 2007].


Hampir semua media massa , baik radio, tivi, dan media cetak, tidak ada yang menggunakan istilah wafat , tapi "mati". Bahkan harian gratis "Direct Matin" yang diterbitkan oleh harian terkemuka Paris, Le Monde dengan sinis mengatakan ketika para peserta Pertemuan Anti Korupsi PBB yang berlangsung di Bali sekarang, berdiri sejenak memberi penghormatan kepada Soeharto sebagai "adegan surealis" [29 Januari 2008]."


Harian Le Monde, Paris, satu-satunya harian yang menerbitkan sehalaman penuh tulisan mantan koresponden Asia Tenggaranya, Jean-Claude Pomonti, malah mensejajarkan kekuasaan Soeharto sebagai kekuasaan"kerajaan Jawa". Dan ujar Pomonti yang lama berdiam di Bangkok: "Yang pasti "kerajaan Jawa" begini tak akan pernah berhasil". [29 Januari 2008].


Pomonti juga melihat bahwa kemelut yang dihadapi Indonesia sekarang tidak lain dari peninggalan Soeharto selama tiga dasawarsa lebih. Masalah-masalah ini tadinya seperti bara dalam sekam dan sekarang muncul ke permukaan. Mantan koresponden Le Monde untuk Asia Tenggara ini juga menyebut rezim Soeharto merupakan "salah satu pemerintahan yang paling berdarah dan paling korup pada paro kedua abad ke-XX" [l'un des gouvernants les plus sanguinaires et les plus corrompus de la deuxième moitié du XX siècle]. Rezim diktatur Soeharto jugalah, ujar Pomonti, yang menenggelamkan Indonesia ke genangan hutang.


Soeharto juga dihubungkan benar oleh media massa Perancis dengan penindasan dan pembunuhan di Timor Timur sambil mengingatkan tuntutan José Ramos Horta, sekarang presiden Timor Leste, agar diktatur Soeharto "diadili atas genosid" yang ia lakukan selama berkuasa.[La Croix, 28 Januari 2008].


Membaca pers Perancis dan mendengar siaran radio serta tivi negeri ini, tak ada sepatah kata sifat baik apa pun yang diucapkan tentang Soeharto bahkan kata wafat [décédé] pun tidak digunakan. Yang digunakan adalah kata "mati" [mort]. Tentu saja berita kematian Soeharto diketahui masyarakat melalui media massa. Dalam konteks ini aku teringat cerita Judith yang menerima sms dari saudaranya di Indonesia: "Soeharto mati, tante meninggal". Sms yang melukiskan secara spontan perasaan dan pikiran masyarakat bawahan pada Soeharto. Pengirim sms sadar benar nuansa kata "mati" dan "meninggal" atau wafat, berpulang.


Ketika aku servis malam di Koperasi Restoran Indonesia, tidak sedikit pelanggan yang bertanya: "Mantan presiden kalian baru meninggal iya?".


Tanpa mengulas pertanyaan ini, karena sedang sibuk, aku hanya menjawab singkat: "Iya".

"Mudahan kediktaturan tidak terulang lagi di negeri Anda".


"Iya, itu pun harapan rakyat negeriku, hanya barangkali jalannya masih tidak mulus sebagaimana halnya dengan jalan harapan ".


"Demikianlah hidup. C'est la vie, anak muda. Apalagi di dunia politik", ujar pelanggan tuaku, tanpa rambut dan mengenakan jas warna oranye. "Yang penting adalah bagaimana bisa belajar dari masa silam untuk kepentingan hari ini dan esok", tambahnya.


Aku mengucapkan terimakasih atas perhatian, harapan dan kata-kata baiknya. Oleh perhatian, harapan dan kata-kata baik dari seorang asing ini kepadaku yang terpental dari negeri kelahiran, membuatku merasa bahwa jarak Paris-Jakarta, antara Rue de Vaugirard dan jalan Tawes, tak terlalu jauh-jauh juga, dan betapa dunia makin menjadi sebuah "desa kecil", di mana peduduknya saling bersentuhan bagai tetangga. Kepentingan mereka pun tak terkurung pada batas geografis satu dua negara, tapi saling taut-menaut seperti yang sering dikatakan di sini "Agir ici et là" [Bertindak di sini sama dengan bertindak untuk di sana]. Mereka ada di satu "desa kecil dunia" bernama " kemanusiaan yang tunggal", jika menggunakan ungkapan Paul Ricoeur.


Ah, sungguh, aku mau jadi manusia yang manusiawi walau pun sebagai pekerja kasar biasa pada sebuah koperasi restoran.***



Paris, Musim Dingin 2008.
-----------------------------------
JJ. Kusni, pekerja biasa pada Koperasi Restoran Indonesia, Paris.

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Supersemar asli?

Silakan klik:



http://whitegun.files.wordpress.com/2007/05/supersemar.jpg

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Soeharto dan anak-anaknya: "Kowe pancen sing bener, Ben!"

Oleh Kristanto Hartadi

JAKARTA-Ini sebuah kisah yang dituturkan oleh seorang mayor jenderal yang kini masih aktif. Dia pernah sangat dekat dengan almarhum Jenderal (purn) Leonardus Benny Moerdany, mantan Menhankam dan mantan Panglima ABRI, orang paling kuat kedua di Republik Indonesia setelah Presiden Soeharto pada periode 1983-1993.

Menurut jenderal itu, ketika Benny Moerdany sudah berada di puncak sakit stroke yang dideritanya, Soeharto datang menjenguk mantan pembantu dekatnya itu dan ada ucapan khusus yang disampaikan kepada Benny, dalam bahasa Jawa: "Kowe pancen sing bener, Ben. Nek aku manut nasihatmu ora koyo ngene" (memang kamu yang betul, Ben. Kalau saya menuruti nasehatmu mungkin keadaan tidak seperti sekarang). Benny yang sudah sulit bicara karena sakitnya, hanya menangis sesenggukan.

Menurut sumber itu, ucapan Soeharto itu diulang kembali di depan jenazah ketika melayat LB Moerdani yang akhirnya meninggal dunia karena strokenya itu pada 29 Agustus 2004.

Episode itu, yang mudah-mudahan bisa dituangkan secara lebih terperinci dalam sebuah buku oleh sang saksi mata, akan lepas begitu saja bila kita tidak melihat kaitan-kaitan di belakangnya.

Tentu saja yang dimaksud Soeharto adalah situasi hiruk-pikuk dan kacau-balau yang terjadi dalam kancah kehidupan sosial politik di Indonesia seusai kejatuhannya pada 21 Mei 1998, yang memulai Era Reformasi. Mereka yang menikmati "kemapanan" semasa kekuasaan Orde Baru pastilah pusing kepala melihat segala tatanan dijungkirbalikkan di Orde Reformasi ini. TNI tidak lagi punya gigi, pemerintah juga seperti tak berdaya, kerusuhan pecah di mana-mana, Timor Timur merdeka, dan seterusnya, dan seterusnya.

Menurut catatan penulis biografi, Julius Pour, dalam buku Benny Tragedi Seorang Loyalis, perpecahan Soeharto dan Benny berawal di suatu malam dari sebuah insiden di ruang bilyar di Jalan Cendana, kediaman Soeharto, saat kedua orang kuat di republik ini main bilyar bersama. Ketika itu Benny mengingatkan Soeharto bahwa untuk pengamanan politik presiden, seluruh keluarga dan presiden harus mendukung dan terlibat. "Begitu saya angkat masalah tentang anak-anaknya tersebut, Pak Harto langsung berhenti main. Segera masuk kamar tidur, meninggalkan saya di ruang bilyar… sendirian," kata Benny seperti dituturkan oleh dr Ben Mboi, mantan gubernur NTT.

Sejak saat itu posisi Benny surut di mata Soeharto, karena berani mengingatkan presiden untuk secara sukarela mundur karena telah memimpin lebih dari 20 tahun. Dia dicopot sebagai Panglima ABRI pada tahun 1988, digantikan Jenderal Try Sutrisno, mantan ajudan presiden, namun masih diberi jabatan sebagai Menteri Pertahanan (1988-1993), karena Soeharto khawatir Benny berontak.

Ketika sudah tidak di pemerintahan, Benny berkata bahwa masa pemerintahan Soeharto yang kelima adalah yang terakhir. "Masak setelah 25 tahun masih terus?" itu katanya. Namun tidak pernah dijelaskan bagaimana cara Soeharto akan atau harus mengakhiri kekuasaannya, karena kesadaran itu harus datang dari Soeharto sendiri. Dan akhirnya memang Soeharto diturunkan oleh gerakan reformasi pada 21 Mei 1998.

Melindungi Anak-anaknya

Melindungi anak-anaknya mungkin merupakan salah satu alasan kenapa Soeharto enggan melepaskan jabatannya, atau mempersiapkan cara-cara menjalankan suksesi. Padahal wacana suksesi sudah banyak dilontarkan berbagai pihak dan berbagai skenario sudah disusun, termasuk oleh Mabes TNI di Cilangkap. Tetapi tidak ada yang berani melawan Soeharto.

Memang, ketika Benny mengingatkan Soeharto dan keluarganya agar menjaga dan melindungi kepresidenan, anak-anak Soeharto beserta kroni mereka baru mulai membesarkan kerajaan bisnis masing-masing dengan memanfaatkan kekuasaan sang ayah.

Mengenai hal ini, mantan PM Singapura Lee Kuan Yew menuturkan dalam buku memoarnya From Third World to First: The Singapore Story, dia secara pribadi pernah bertemu dengan anak-anak Soeharto pada 25 Desember 1997 di Singapura, yang juga dihadiri oleh PM Goh Chok Tong. Dia mengingatkan mereka agar berhenti menjalankan praktik bisnis yang tidak sehat, karena mereka diincar oleh para fund manager yang gerah dengan tingkah polah itu dan bisa saja memainkan nilai tukar rupiah. "Perilaku anak-anak Soeharto menyumbang kejatuhan orang tuanya," tulis Lee dalam memoar yang diluncurkan pada September 2000 tersebut.

Memang, bisnis anak-anak dan kroni Soeharto begitu merajalela, memasuki hampir setiap sektor kehidupan, mulai dari pengadaan barang bagi TNI/Polri dan berbagai instansi pemerintah, real estate, otomotif, jalan tol, bank, minyak, perkebunan, telekomunikasi, properti, impor beras, bungkil, kedelai, peternakan, ritel, komputerisasi SIM dan STNK, stiker halal, penerbangan, taksi, pertambangan, kehutanan, dan lain-lain.

Mereka tidak berbisnis sendiri, dan pada umumnya mereka juga menggandeng sejumlah konglomerat yang menjadi kroni. Banyak pihak yang menilai pada masa itulah Soeharto sudah seperti raja Jawa, dan membiarkan anak-anak maupun kroni-kroninya berbuat sesukanya. Negara seperti milik keluarganya dan dia melindungi.

Salah satu modus lainnya untuk mengumpulkan uang adalah dengan mendirikan berbagai yayasan, atau mereka menjadi calo untuk menggolkan berbagai proyek pemerintah, atau mereka menguasai tata niaga, mulai dari cengkih, jeruk pontianak, cukai minuman keras, dan lain-lain.

Misalnya saja, untuk PT Sarpindo yang sahamnya dikuasai Hutomo Mandala Putra, Bob Hasan dan Lim Sioe Liong, satu-satunya perusahaan yang mengimpor kedelai untuk Bulog, pemerintah harus menyubsidi perusahaan ini senilai US$ 21 juta per tahun. Dan ketika Menteri Pertanian Wardoyo (ketika itu) meminta pemerintah mengakhiri monopoli impor ini karena sangat tidak kompetitif, Soeharto hanya berkata: "Kalau mau membunuh Sarpindo, silakan." Ujung-ujungnya, semua yang mengusulkan deregulasi impor bungkil ini akhirnya mundur teratur. Hal yang sama terjadi dengan impor gandum yang ketika itu dimonopoli perusahaan milik Lim Sioe Liong. (Adam Schwarz, A Nation in Waiting, hal 133-134).

Monopoli dan menjadi calo adalah cara yang ditempuh anak-anak dan para kroni Soeharto untuk membesarkan kerajaan bisnis mereka. Siapa yang tidak kenal dengan kelompok bisnis anak-anak Soeharto seperti Bimantara (Bambang Trihatmojo), Citra Lamtoro Gung (Siti Hardiyati Rukmana), Humpuss (Hutomo Mandala Putra), bahkan sampai cucu Soeharto pun ikut terjun berbisnis. Bahkan di antara mereka pun berebut proyek. Sampai-sampai ada yang menyebutkan bahwa yang paling transparan di Indonesia pada masa itu adalah korupsi! Majalah Time pernah menyebut dari berbagai bisnis ini keluarga Soeharto berhasil mengumpulkan kekayaan hingga US$ 15 miliar.

Bisnis anak-anak Soeharto, seperti Bank Andromeda dan mobil "nasional" merek Timor yang sebenarnya buatan perusahaan Korea KIA, termasuk dalam kegiatan usaha yang diminta oleh IMF untuk diakhiri sebagai salah satu syarat dalam letter of intent ketika Indonesia akhirnya minta bantuan kepada dunia internasional karena krisis ekonomi 1997.

Namun hebatnya, meski ditengarai banyak hal yang tidak wajar dari bisnis anak-anak Soeharto, hanya Tommy saja yang tersandung di sana dan di sini. Lima anak Soeharto yang lain sampai hari ini aman-aman saja. Yang menjadi pertanyaan, kini, setelah Soeharto tiada, apakah anak-anaknya masih bisa tenang menikmati kekayaan yang pernah mereka jarah dari Indonesia? Kita lihat saja...

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30.1.08

Soekarno - Sejarah yang tak memihak

Soekarno VS Soeharto

Malam minggu. Hawa panas dan angin seolah diam tak berhembus. Malam ini saya bermalam di rumah ibu saya. Selain rindu masakan sambel goreng ati yang dijanjikan, saya juga ingin ia bercerita mengenai Presiden Soekarno. Ketika semua mata saat ini sibuk tertuju, seolah menunggu saat saat berpulangnya Soeharto, saya justru lebih tertarik mendengar penuturan saat berpulang Sang proklamator. Karena orang tua saya adalah salah satu orang yang pertama tama bisa melihat secara langsung jenasah Soekarno.

Saat itu medio Juni 1970. Ibu yang baru pulang berbelanja, mendapatkan Bapak (almarhum) sedang menangis sesenggukan. " Pak Karno seda " ( meninggal). Dengan menumpang kendaraan militer mereka bisa sampai di Wisma Yaso. Suasana sungguh sepi. Tidak ada penjagaan dari
kesatuan lain kecuali 3 truk berisi prajurit Marinir ( dulu KKO ). Saat itu memang Angkatan Laut, khususnya KKO sangat loyal terhadap Bung Karno. Jenderal KKO Hartono - Panglima
KKO - pernah berkata , " Hitam kata Bung Karno, hitam kata KKO. Merah kata Bung Karno, merah kata KKO ".

Banyak prediksi memperkirakan seandainya saja Bung Karno menolak untuk turun, dia dengan mudah akan melibas Mahasiswa dan Pasukan Jendral Soeharto, karena dia masih didukung oleh
KKO, Angkatan Udara, beberapa divisi Angkatan Darat seperti Brawijaya dan terutama Siliwangi dengan panglimanya May. Jend Ibrahim Ajie.

Namun Bung Karno terlalu cinta terhadap negara ini. Sedikitpun ia tidak mau memilih opsi pertumpahan darah sebuah bangsa yang telah dipersatukan dengan susah payah. Ia memilih sukarela turun, dan membiarkan dirinya menjadi tumbal sejarah.

The winner takes it all. Begitulah sang pemenang tak akan sedikitpun menyisakan ruang bagi mereka yang kalah. Soekarno harus meninggalkan istana pindah ke istana Bogor . Tak berapa
lama datang surat dari Panglima Kodam Jaya - Mayjend Amir Mahmud - disampaikan jam 8 pagi yang meminta bahwa Istana Bogor harus sudah dikosongkan jam 11 siang.

Buru buru Bu Hartini, istri Bung Karno mengumpulkan pakaian dan barang barang yang dibutuhkan serta membungkusnya dengan kain sprei. Barang barang lain semuanya ditinggalkan.

" Het is niet meer mijn huis " - sudahlah, ini bukan rumah saya lagi , demikian Bung Karno menenangkan istrinya. Sejarah kemudian mencatat, Soekarno pindah ke Istana Batu Tulis sebelum akhirnya dimasukan kedalam karantina di Wisma Yaso. Beberapa panglima dan loyalis dipenjara. Jendral Ibrahim Adjie diasingkan menjadi dubes di London. Jendral KKO Hartono secara misterius mati terbunuh di rumahnya.

Kembali ke kesaksian yang diceritakan ibu saya. Saat itu belum banyak yang datang, termasuk keluarga Bung Karno sendiri. Tak tahu apa mereka masih di RSPAD sebelumnya. Jenasah dibawa ke Wisma Yaso. Di ruangan kamar yang suram, terbaring sang proklamator yang separuh hidupnya dihabiskan di penjara dan pembuangan kolonial Belanda. Terbujur dan
mengenaskan. Hanya ada Bung Hatta! dan Ali Sadikin - Gubernur Jakarta - yang juga berasal dari KKO Marinir.

Bung Karno meninggal masih mengenakan sarung lurik warna merah serta baju hem coklat. Wajahnya bengkak-bengkak dan rambutnya sudah botak. Kita tidak membayangkan kamar yang bersih, dingin berAC dan penuh dengan alat alat medis disebelah tempat tidurnya. Yang
ada hanya termos dengan gelas kotor, serta sesisir buah pisang yang sudah hitam dipenuhi jentik jentik seperti nyamuk. Kamar itu agak luas, dan jendelanya blong tidak ada gordennya. Dari dalam bisa terlihat halaman belakang yang ditumbuhi rumput alang alang setinggi dada manusia!

Setelah itu Bung Karno diangkat. Tubuhnya dipindahkan ke atas karpet di lantai di ruang tengah
Ibu dan Bapak saya serta beberapa orang disana sungkem kepada jenasah, sebelum akhirnya Guntur Soekarnoputra datang, dan juga orang orang lain.

Namun Pemerintah orde baru juga kebingungan kemana hendak dimakamkan jenasah proklamator. Walau dalam Bung Karno berkeingan agar kelak dimakamkan di Istana Batu Tulis,
Bogor. Pihak militer tetap tak mau mengambil resiko makam seorang Soekarno yang berdekatan dengan ibu kota . Maka dipilih Blitar, kota kelahirannya sebagai peristirahatan terakhir. Tentu saja Presiden Soeharto tidak menghadiri pemakaman ini.

Dalam catatan Kolonel Saelan, bekas wakil komandan Cakrabirawa, " Bung Karno diinterogasi oleh Tim Pemeriksa Pusat di Wisma Yaso. Pemeriksaan dilakukan dengan cara cara yang amat kasar, dengan memukul mukul meja dan memaksakan jawaban".

"Akibat perlakuan kasar terhadap Bung Karno, penyakitnya makin parah karena memang tidak mendapatkan pengobatan yang seharusnya diberikan. "

( Dari Revolusi 1945 sampai Kudeta 1966)

Dr. Kartono Mohamad yang pernah mempelajari catatan tiga perawat Bung Karno sejak 7 februari 1969 sampai 9 Juni 1970 serta mewancarai dokter Bung Karno berkesimpulan telah
terjadi penelantaran. Obat yang diberikan hanya vitamin B, B12 dan duvadillan untuk mengatasi penyempitan darah. Padahal penyakitnya gangguan fungsi ginjal. Obat yang lebih baik dan mesin cuci darah tidak diberikan.

( Kompas 11 Mei 2006 )

Rachmawati Soekarnoputri, menjelaskan lebih lanjut, " Bung Karno justru dirawat oleh dokter hewan saat di Istana Batutulis. Salah satu perawatnya juga bukan perawat. Tetapi dari Kowad"

( Kompas 13 Januari 2008 )

Sangat berbeda dengan dengan perlakuan terhadap mantan Presiden Soeharto, yang setiap hari tersedia dokter dokter dan peralatan canggih untuk memperpanjang hidupnya, dan masih didampingi tim pembela yang dengan sangat gigih membela kejahatan yang dituduhkan.

Sekalipun Soeharto tidak pernah datang berhadapan dengan pemeriksanya, dan ketika tim kejaksaan harus datang ke rumahnya di Cendana. Mereka harus menyesuaikan dengan jadwal tidur siang sang Presiden!

Malam semakin panas. Tiba tiba saja udara dalam dada semakin bertambah sesak. Saya membayangkan sebuah bangsa yang menjadi kerdil dan munafik. Apakah jejak sejarah tak pernah mengajarkan kejujuran ketika justru manusia merasa bisa meniupkan roh roh kebenaran?

Kisah tragis ini tidak banyak diketahui orang. Kesaksian tidak pernah menjadi hakiki karena selalu ada tabir tabir di sekelilingnya yang diam membisu.

Selalu saja ada korban dari mereka yang mempertentangkan benar atau salah.

Butuh waktu bagi bangsa ini untuk menjadi arif.

Kesadaran adalah Matahari Kesabaran adalah Bumi

Keberanian menjadi cakrawala Keterbukaan adalah pelaksanaan kata kata


( * WS Rendra )

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Misteri Senyum Daripadamu

Oleh: Zawawi

harihari tanpa daripadamu
semangkin nyeri semangkin sunyi
menyelami parutparut hati
yang engkau goresken melalui
tangantangan daripada kekuasaan

sebuah masa dimana warnawarna
adalah sebuah jalan kehidupan
engkau campakken mereka
yang tak sewarna, serupa juga seirama

kini, misteri senyum daripadamu
tak lagi membuat kami merekaduga
kerna disebuah bukit yang engkau bangun
sebagai kedinastian daripadamu
telah kokoh mendekapmu beristirah


Kota Pudak, 31 Januari 2008

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RI needs UN assistance to recover stolen assets

Indonesia is hosting the second session of the conference of the State Parties to the United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC) from Monday to Friday this week at the Bali International Convention Center. Some 1,000 officials and activists from 120 countries are participating in the event aimed at creating a better international system to jointly fight corruption. The Jakarta Post's Abdul Khalik talked to Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda on how Indonesia can play a role in the conference.

Question: Have we submitted our self-assessment checklist on our compliance with the UN Convention Against Corruption and what weaknesses have we spotted in our battle against corruption?

Answer: Yes. Together with the checklist, we have even submitted our gap analysis on the laws and legal institutions we have and the requirements under the UNCAC. What needs to improve is our law on corruption as it deals only with corruption in the public sector, and is without provisions for corruption committed in the private sector or by corporations.

We need to include private sector corruption into our law as many countries like Singapore and Hong Kong have done that. With this incompatibility, we will have difficulties dealing with those countries when we want to recover our assets or extradite a suspect.

That is only the norm. We need also to empower our existing legal institutions dealing with corruption, such as the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) or the National Ombudsman Commission, but the question is whether we have an adequate legal system to fight corruption. Fighting corruption is not only about prosecution but also prevention.

We should also improve the capacity of our staff as we have felt that when we conducted efforts to trace and recover stolen assets abroad, we lacked the expertise. So, we need technical assistance from the United Nations.

Is there any dichotomy of interests between developing and developed countries, as speculation has spread, for instance, that developing states want to push for asset recovery first while developed countries want developing countries to fix their domestic prevention system first?

As this convention is dealing more on technical matters with less political sensitivity compared to, for instance, climate change issues, I think the dichotomy is not that big. We can overcome that. You see, no countries can claim themselves to be free of corruption.

So, there is a strong and united will from most participating countries to cooperate in fighting corruption because they realize that it is a disease, and when you don't fight it, it will become a pandemic. A conference like this serves as a medium for cooperation.

The government has announced that stolen assets recovery is one of its priorities. But difficulties in asking for and accepting mutual legal assistance as well as differences in legal systems have hampered asset recovery efforts.

How will the conference bridge these problems?

Most of the countries have agreed that international and regional cooperation as well as a multilateral convention, like UNCAC that allows for cooperation in mutual legal assistance and extradition, have actually much to do to limit the moves of transnational corruptors. All of these links have deterred corruptors and prevented them from finding safe places to hide.

An effective convention will also deter state parties from continuing to enjoy money taken from corruption. In other words, these countries will find it difficult to play out of the system.

The conference aims to establish an agreeable mechanism and forum to find ways to address the problems found in mutual legal assistance and bridge the differences in different domestic legal systems.

Is there any specific mechanism Indonesia has proposed to address these issues?

We have proposed the establishment of a consultative group consisting of experts from developed and developing countries. The group will serve as a forum to discuss all matters related to difficulties found in the mutual legal assistance process and asset recovery in general.

Our proposal has been supported by the G-77 comprising 130 countries, and China. Some developed countries have also backed our proposal. We are very optimistic that we can adopt the mechanism by the end of the conference.

How will UNCAC overcome corruption eradication problems at the bilateral level, including the ongoing discussion with Singapore?

I think a country will have shown its commitment to fight corruption by becoming a party to the convention and the move will boost its image as a committed country. If Singapore is a party then we can cooperate under the convention but if the country is not a party, we can't force them to cooperate. But then public opinion will judge the issue.

What about the StAR (Stolen Assets Recovery) initiative? How can we benefit from this UN program?

StAR is an initiative launched by the World Bank and the United Nations to enhance the capability of developing countries' officials to trace and recover assets. So it is a capacity building program, not an initiative to investigate or confiscate the stolen assets.

We are the first country to apply for the program because we know that we still have poor capacity in tracing and recovering our stolen assets. Tracing and then recovering our assets are not easy and cheap tasks, so we need all assistance we can get.

 

http://www.thejakartapost.com

 

 

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Suharto (8 June 1921- 27 January 2008)

A career soldier who commanded a country.
 

John Roosa
 
Taciturn, reserved, reclusive, emotionless, Suharto ruled Indonesia for 32 years as a mystery man, a dictator who presented himself as a faceless, replaceable figure in an apolitical administration. His speeches were dull, forgettable affairs filled with mind-numbing bureaucratese, worn clichés, and pious homilies. There is not a single statement by which he is remembered today. If asked, Indonesians struggle in vain to recall some memorable phrase from him, while even the youth can quote Sukarno, the president he overthrew in 1965. Suharto has left a wordless memory.
 
Rarely interviewed but frequently photographed, he is remembered by a gesture: a smile. It was how he wished to be known: his 1969 authorised biography was titled The Smiling General. It was a Cheshire cat smile, fixed in place, concealing, not expressing his emotional life, prompting puzzlement about the intrigues and violence that were being conjured up in the mind behind it.
 
Suharto's parentage is a matter of mystery. In his 'autobiography' written by the man most responsible for crafting his public image, G Dwipayana, Suharto claims he was born to a poor peasant family in the village of Kemusuk near Yogyakarta. A magazine owned by his trusted military intelligence czar claimed in 1974 that his father had been an aristocrat. In what was perhaps a pre-planned response, Suharto invited journalists to his office in the presidential palace to explain his lineage and produce witnesses who could vouch that he was the true salt of the earth. Despite his protestations, his genealogy remains suspect. Among Indonesians it is widely rumored that he was the illegitimate child of a Chinese businessman. 

A pleasant career
 
Whatever his origins and childhood experiences, his adulthood was clearly that of a career soldier. He enlisted in the Dutch military in 1940, an event he mentions in his 'autobiography' as 'the key to opening a door to a pleasant walk of life'. The pleasant life of marching and drilling continued under the Japanese occupation when he became a member of that colonial state's militia. Like all other militiamen, he joined the newly-created Indonesian national army once the Japanese military surrendered in August 1945. There was no question of going back to serve with the Dutch – they had already been stripped of all their power and wealth by the Japanese and had suffered the war years in squalid concentration camps.
 
Because of his military training, Suharto was given a high rank (lieutenant colonel) in the new Indonesian army that organised itself to fight a guerrilla war against the returning Dutch troops. By 1948, he had become the commander of a brigade of troops stationed in and around Yogyakarta, the capital of the Republic. The army's guerrilla attacks did little to slow the advance of the Dutch troops. Despite having the homefield advantage, Suharto was caught by surprise on 19 December 1948 when Dutch troops invaded Yogyakarta and captured it the same day without facing any resistance. Inexplicably, all four of Suharto's battalions were outside the city. It was one of the worst setbacks for the Republic: its two highest leaders, Sukarno and Hatta, were captured.

As early as 1948 he had said 'My politics are at the end of the bayonet.'
 
Suharto had a chance to redeem himself when he led an attack on Yogyakarta in March 1949. The attack inflicted only minor damage to the Dutch troops occupying the city and was repulsed within six hours. Suharto and other army commanders, however, claimed that they had temporarily held the city and proven the might of the Republic's forces to the world. After Suharto took power in 1965 the event was turned into the decisive victory of the war for independence, with a film made about it, Janur Kuning (1979), and a grand monument built in the city (1985).
 
As a man who served in three different armies within the span of a decade, Suharto wore his political commitments lightly. One of his army colleagues later told a journalist that Suharto said in 1948, 'My politics are at the end of the bayonet.' No wonder that Sukarno and his left-leaning defence minister introduced political commissars into the army. Like many soldiers trained under Dutch and Japanese officers, Suharto had no experience in the popular nationalist movement that had struggled against imperialism.  
Moving up the ranks
 
After independence was won in 1949, Suharto rose his way up the ranks: colonel, brigadier general, major general. His one setback came in 1959 when he was removed from the command of the Central Java troops for corruption. But the affair was hushed up and he was quickly rehabilitated. He was given command over the operation to seize West Papua from the Dutch in 1962 – an operation that was aborted after a last-minute diplomatic agreement. He was then shifted to Jakarta and given command over the army reserves, Kostrad, in 1963. With an undistinguished record, rudimentary education, and no ability in a foreign language, he was by 1965 a prime candidate for the highest position in the army, serving as the replacement for the army commander, Yani, whenever he traveled abroad.
 
Suharto had risen to the top of an army that was becoming a kind of parallel government, using its territorial commands, originally designed for defence against foreign invasion, for ruling over civil society. Most of his fellow generals, including the senior-most, A.H. Nasution, were strongly anti-communist and determined to check the rising power of the communist party (PKI) in the early 1960s. To rival the party, they sponsored trade unions, artists' associations, and newspapers. They met with religious organisations and political parties and assured them that the army would use force if need be against the PKI. 
 
Suharto did not clearly associate himself with either side. A former PKI member of the parliament told me that DN Aidit, the head of the party, believed in early 1965 that Suharto was a 'democratic' officer because he had supported the ending of the army's martial law powers in 1963. But Suharto was also collaborating with the anti-communists in his covert effort to put the brakes on Sukarno's anti-Malaysia campaign, begun in 1963.

His lucky day
 
Suharto's fence-sitting ultimately proved to be what him put into power. When the pro-PKI and pro-Sukarno army officers decided to strike against their rival officers, they assumed Suharto would support them. A group of junior officers organised the kidnapping raids of seven army generals on 1 October 1965. Two of the conspirators were good friends of Suharto's and one of them told Suharto beforehand about the plot. The abductors, calling themselves the September 30th Movement, wound up killing six generals, among them the army commander Yani. It was Suharto's lucky day. In Yani's absence he became army commander. The September 30th Movement had not been masterminded by Suharto but it played into his hands perfectly.
 
As army commander, Suharto immediately began defying presidential orders and implementing the long-standing agenda of the anti-communist officers, which was to reduce Sukarno to a figurehead president, destroy the PKI, and establish a military dictatorship. Suharto's anti-communism did not stem from any deep-seated ideological commitment. If the September 30th Movement had succeeded and the communists had gained more power, one can easily imagine the ever-opportunistic Suharto accommodating himself to the new regime. He was such a nondescript, unremarkable officer that many observers believed in the first weeks of October that he was merely following General Nasution's lead.

The creeping coup d'état
 
Sidelining President Sukarno turned out not to be too difficult. The grand old man of Indonesian nationalism, the 'extension of the people's tongue', kept voicing protests but did nothing concrete to stop Suharto's guns. He confirmed Suharto as army commander, raised his rank, and gave him emergency powers. The coup de grâce of the gradual coup d'état came in March 1966 when Suharto used a vaguely worded order from Sukarno about 'guaranteeing security' as a justification for arresting 15 ministers and dismissing Sukarno's cabinet – as if the president ordered his own overthrow. 
 
The destruction of the PKI – the precondition for imposing a new military-dominated polity – turned out not to be too difficult either. The PKI leadership, in disarray after 1 October, urged its followers not to resist so that President Sukarno could arrange a political resolution to the crisis. But the president had no power over Suharto's army. Working with civilian militias, the army organised one of the worst bloodbaths of the twentieth century, rounding up over one million people and then secretly executing many of them. Detainees disappeared at night. Mass graves holding uncounted corpses lie unmarked all over Sumatra, Java and Bali.  
The September 30th Movement was not masterminded by Suharto but it played into his hands perfectly.
 
No document exists proving that Suharto ordered any killing. On the rare occasion when he mentioned the killings in later years he blamed them on civilians running amok. Serious investigations into the who, where, when and how questions about the killings reveal that the army was primarily responsible and that Suharto must have at least approved of them if he did not give an explicit oral or written order for them.
Carrots and sticks
 
In taking power Suharto and his fellow army officers realised that the long-term stability of their rule would depend on their ability to improve living standards. They looked to foreign aid, investment and markets to provide the main stimuli for economic growth. Western capital which had been boycotting Indonesia because of Sukarno's policies found the welcome mat laid out. Suharto personally intervened in late 1965 to stop Sukarno's minister of industries from nationalising the oil sector. With the army's terror campaign against unionists at oil wells, rubber plantations, and factories, Western capital was also given a more docile labor force.
 
One reason for Suharto's remarkable ability to stay in power for so long lies in his expansion of public sector employment. By the end of his reign, 4.6 million people were on the state payroll, about triple the number in the early 1970s. Millions more were dependents on these salary earners. The security of the monthly paycheck was attractive even if the income was low. Also, some government jobs came with chances to earn more money through corruption. These civil servants and their relatives were the regime's key base of support, voting and campaigning for the government party Golkar in every election. Those not voting for Golkar were denounced for biting the hand that fed them and stood little chance of earning a promotion.
 
Suharto's habitual response to dissent was, to use today's lexicon, shock and awe. In Papua, he maintained an army of occupation that treated the indigenous population as sub-humans whose loyalty had to be won through violence. For years, the only side of Indonesia that Papuans saw was the army. He was responsible for the tens of thousands of Papuans killed in the counterinsurgency campaign from the late 1960s to 1998. He was also responsible for the war of aggression against East Timor in 1975 and the over 100,000 people there who died because of the warfare in that half-island. He was also responsible for the deaths of thousands of Acehnese who were victims of yet another counterinsurgency campaign (1990-98) designed to terrorise civilians into not supporting the guerrillas, instead of offering the civilians a more positive alternative.
 
Suharto stubbornly pursued the same strategy even when it was proving to be counterproductive, when the terror inflicted in Papua, East Timor and Aceh was generating more widespread resistance. Only after Suharto's downfall have Indonesian politicians had the chance to pursue wiser, more humane diplomatic and political resolutions to these wars: President Habibie allowed a UN-administered referendum in East Timor in 1999 and President Yudhoyono concluded a peace treaty with the Acehnese nationalists in 2005. 

The grand Ponzi scheme collapses
 
In evaluating Suharto's rule, the so-called 'balanced' approach of many Western scholars has been to criticise Suharto for human rights violations but to praise his economic performance. Those impressed by the annual growth rates of six percent are like gullible investors in a Ponzi scheme convinced that the high returns are irrefutable evidence of success. The economic growth of the Suharto years was largely accomplished by wildly selling off the country's natural resources. It was a predatory, unsustainable type of growth. The leading sectors were oil and timber. Both were terribly mismanaged because of the corruption. Today Indonesia is an net oil importer and its forests are rapidly disappearing, cut down by loggers or burned up by palm oil plantation owners. The revenues from all those exports were not reinvested in other sectors; they disappeared into the personal bank accounts of the Suharto family, their cronies (such as Bob Hasan), and state officials.
 
After three decades of economic growth à la Suharto, the Indonesian government was left heavily in debt and the economy left without a domestically-financed industrial base. It is fitting that Suharto, whose minions lauded him as 'the father of development,' passed away in the hospital owned by the state oil company (Pertamina) that his family and cronies (such as Ibnu Sutowo) milked with abandon.

Perhaps the best that can be said of Suharto's 32 year reign is that it could have been worse.
 
Suharto's regime lived by foreign capital and it died by foreign capital. The liberalisation of the financial sector that the US pushed Indonesia to adopt in the early 1990s resulted in much greater vulnerability to sudden international shifts in the capital flows. Money flooded in to Suharto's caste of kleptocrats and their phony banks and then suddenly flooded out. The grand Ponzi scheme collapsed with the Asian economic crisis of 1997. The only legitimacy that Suharto had enjoyed was his apparent ability to engineer economic growth. Once that ended the usually compliant middle-class turned on him, unwilling to tolerate his corruption, his greedy children and his obscenely wealthy cronies. The spontaneously formed movement for 'reformasi' declared its main enemy to be KKN: Korupsi, Kolusi, and Nepotisme. The Suharto family's own 'I Love the Rupiah' campaign, coming from those who held the most dollars, did not quite have the same cachet.
 
The family's extensive stable of paranormals could not save them, neither could their obsequious army generals, not even Lieutenant General Prabowo, Suharto's son-in-law who commanded elite troops in Jakarta and was always flush with money from his brother who owned the country's one steel mill. Suharto resigned on 21 May as Jakarta was still smouldering from the mysterious riots in which stores owned by Indonesian-Chinese were torched.

Mr Minus
 
Perhaps the best that can be said of Suharto's 32 year reign is that it could have been worse. He did not opt for the strategy of the Burmese generals and close off the country. Dependent upon foreign capital, he was vulnerable to international pressure. The release of tens of thousands of political prisoners in the late 1970s was largely due to pressure from outside the country. He did not opt to legitimate himself through religion and impose Islamic law. The Indonesian state remained largely secular. He did not promote a cult of personality around himself. When faced with mass protests in 1998, he did not opt to stay in power at all costs.
 
The late great Indonesian writer, Pramoedya Ananta Toer, a political prisoner of Suharto's for 14 years, once wrote that he could not bring himself to write about the Suharto regime. While he wrote many historical novels about pre-colonial Java and the Indonesian nationalist movement, he thought nothing interesting could be said about the man responsible for imprisoning him and banning his books. For him, Suharto was a negativity, what he called a 'minus x', a reversion back to Java's colonial-era aristocrats who bullied their subjects for the benefit of European business interests, yet prided themselves of their great cosmic powers, and remained narrow-minded and indifferent to the science and arts of the Europe that had conquered them. No doubt some will remember Suharto for something positive but as Indonesia struggles to overcome his terrible legacies one wonders whether anyone will be able to consider his title 'father of development' as anything other than a cruel joke.     ii
 
John Roosa (jroosa@interchange.ubc.ca) is a member of Inside Indonesia's editorial team, and the author of Pretext for Mass Murder: The September 30th Movement and Suharto's Coup d'État in Indonesia (2006).
 

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Slogan Soehartoisme


"Berhasil harus dipuji, gagal pun wajib dipuji, hilangkan nyawa orang tidak perlu dicari, mematikan orang lain tidak perlu diakui...."

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Damned with praise

From: Kim Eng Yong
Sent: Wednesday, January 30, 2008 2:27:12 PM
Subject: Re:Editorial of the Phil Daily Inquirer on the Death of Suharto

Dear All,

At the opening of the conference of the states parties to the United Nations Convention against corruption in Bali. The Govt. of Indonesia asked all participants to stand up and quiet for one second in order to respect Soharto. It's strange to me that the conference on anti-corruption respected the corrupted person. It seam to encourage the corrupted person. The president of Indonesia, of course, he planed to come to open the conference, he dropped it to attend soharto's funeral and sent his representative to the conference.

Thanks,

Kim Eng

-----------------------------------
 
Editorial: Philippine Daily Inquirer, 29 January 2008


Indonesian President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono set the tone when he called on his countrymen "to pay their last respects to one of Indonesia's best sons." The Indonesian government pulled out all the stops to bury former President Suharto, who died Sunday without ever having to face trial. Despite having been deposed by people power in 1997, he lived long enough to die, not as a thoroughly discredited ex-dictator, but more along the lines of an unlucky former statesman.
Hugo Restall, writing in the Wall Street Journal, loftily intoned, "The positive contributions of the man who made Indonesia a respected member of the international community deserve at least equal emphasis." Echoing similar statements made early this year by Singapore's Lee Kwan Yew, Restall wrote: "Consider that when General Suharto came to power after a failed communist coup in 1965, Indonesia was an economic basket case and a troublemaker in the region. The pro-communist populism of President-for- Life Sukarno had led the country down a dead end. Think of Sukarno as the Hugo Chavez of his era."
Lee Kwan Yew made a spirited defense of his departed, dictatorial friend in his letter of condolence. "I have no doubt history will accord … Suharto a place of honor in Indonesia's history when his life's work is studied in calm perspective," he predicted.

The editorial of the newspaper The Australian said that "for Australia, [Suharto was] the most important and beneficial Asian leader in the entire period after World War II." The paper and conservative Australian leaders cited the Indonesian strongman's interest in regional stability, a line echoed by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. "Generations of Filipinos and Southeast Asians will remember President Suharto for his key role in regional community building and for his contributions to consolidating the gains of peace-building in Mindanao," Ms Arroyo said.

The Wall Street Journal commentary concludes by comparing Suharto to Deng Xiaopeng, both great men, and responsible for a great deal of development in their nations. And, we might add, a great deal of bloodshed. Deng, in his twilight years, ordered the massacre in Tiananmen Square. As for Suharto, his rise to power was bloody: 78,000 dead from 1965 to 1966, according to government estimates; half a million by Reuters' reckoning; a million, according to the American historians Barbara Harff and Ted Robert Gurr. Over the next decade, according to human rights groups, another 300,000 people were killed, vanished, or starved as Suharto crushed independence movements in East Timor, Aceh and Papua New Guinea.

And in case the so-called greatness of Suharto, in the minds of some observers, shouldn't be tainted by tens of thousands of deaths, there remains the question of a personal fortune in the tens of billions of dollars.

Forbes.com quotes a report by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime in September placing the funds siphoned off by Suharto at $35 billion. His children are immensely wealthy: Bambang Trihatmojo (one-time owner of luxury sports car marquee Maserati) has a reported net worth of $200 million, 33rd on Forbes' 2007 Indonesia's richest list.
In a

Canadian Press report, Jeffrey Winters, associate professor of political economy at Northwestern University, provided a summing-up of the economic costs of Suharto's rule. Suharto robbed "Indonesia of some of the most golden decades, and its best opportunity to move from a poor to a middle-class country," he said.

To be sure, Suharto fostered a statesmanlike attitude toward ASEAN, and together with Lee and Ferdinand Marcos, turned our part of the world into a bulwark against the expansion of communism. For a time, Suharto and Marcos achieved spectacular growth for their countries, but unlike Lee, they failed to step down and groom qualified successors. They also looted their countries, which is something Lee has never been successfully accused of doing. This makes Lee an aberration, and neither Marcos nor Suharto a great man.

This goes to the heart of the grim inheritance Suharto left the Indonesian people: one that again proves true the old adage that if you steal enough, all will be forgiven, as well as the one that says absolute power corrupts absolutely./ //

 

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